Quantum Threat & Cryptographic Agility
A Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computer (CRQC) breaks RSA, ECDSA, and ECDH via Shor's algorithm. NIST published three quantum-safe standards in August 2024. Cryptographic agility is the ability to negotiate and rotate algorithms without changing protocols.
NIST PQC Standards
| Standard | Algorithm | Purpose | Security Level |
|---|---|---|---|
| FIPS 203 | ML-KEM (Kyber) | Key encapsulation (replaces ECDH) | L1/L3/L5 |
| FIPS 204 | ML-DSA (Dilithium) | Digital signatures (replaces ECDSA) | L2/L3/L5 |
| FIPS 205 | SLH-DSA (SPHINCS+) | Hash-based signatures (stateless) | L1/L3/L5 |
| FIPS 206 | FN-DSA (FALCON) | Fast lattice signatures — small key/sig sizes for constrained environments | L1/L5 |
| SP 800-208 | LMS / XMSS | Stateful hash-based signatures — deploy-now for firmware/software signing (CNSA 2.0 required) | Various |
| HQC (selected 2025) | Hamming Quasi-Cyclic | Second KEM, code-based — algorithm diversity backup for ML-KEM | L1/L3/L5 |
Migration Path — Case by Case
There is no universal two-phase migration. The right path for each system is determined by cryptographic discovery first — asset type, data lifetime, and interoperability requirements. ASD advises that hybrid is not universally recommended; the choice is per asset class.
Greenfield systems, internal mesh services, and short-lived credentials. No interoperability constraint — skip hybrid entirely, reduce complexity. Often the right default for new systems.
Where backward compatibility is required, or where HNDL-sensitive long-lived data exists. Both algorithms must be broken simultaneously to compromise. Evaluate per asset class — not a universal first step.
Systems with no HNDL or TNFL exposure: short-lived data with no confidentiality requirement beyond the CRQC era, or assets scheduled for decommission. Discovery + criticality determines this bucket.
Cryptographic Discovery — Start Here
Before choosing algorithms or migration paths, you need to know what cryptography you have and where it lives. Discovery produces a CBOM (Cryptographic Bill of Materials) — an inventory of every algorithm in use, cross-referenced with asset criticality. The CBOM determines your actual risk surface and which migration path applies to each system.
What a CBOM Covers
| Asset Category | Examples | Algorithm in Use | Relevant Threat |
|---|---|---|---|
| Key exchange | TLS handshakes, ECDH-wrapped symmetric keys | ECDH P-256 / P-384, X25519 | HNDL |
| Token signing | JWTs, OAuth tokens, SAML assertions | ECDSA (ES256/ES384), RSA (RS256) | TNFL |
| Certificate signing | TLS leaf certs, mTLS SVIDs, Root CA | ECDSA P-256 / P-384, RSA-2048 | TNFL |
| Code signatures | Signed binaries, container images, firmware | ECDSA, RSA-PSS | TNFL ⚠ high priority |
| Encrypted data at rest | Database encryption, key wrapping, backup encryption | AES-GCM (safe); RSA/ECDH key-wrap (unsafe) | HNDL (key-wrap only) |
| Symmetric encryption | AES-128/256, ChaCha20-Poly1305 | AES, ChaCha20 | Low — Grover's doubles cost only |
| Hash functions | SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 | SHA-2, SHA-3 | Low — use SHA-384+ for margin |
Asset Criticality Matrix
Cross-reference each CBOM entry against data lifetime and sensitivity to assign migration priority:
| Short lifetime (<1 yr) | Medium lifetime (1–10 yr) | Long / indefinite (>10 yr) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Low sensitivity | Defer | Monitor | Plan migration |
| High sensitivity / regulated | Plan migration | Priority — HNDL / TNFL risk | Immediate — HNDL / TNFL risk |
| Root CAs / code signing keys | Plan migration | Priority — TNFL risk | Immediate — TNFL risk |
HNDL vs TNFL — Which Assets Are at Risk
An adversary recording ciphertext today can decrypt it once a CRQC exists. Urgency scales with data confidentiality lifetime.
- TLS session key exchange (ECDH leg)
- RSA or ECDH-wrapped symmetric keys
- Encrypted backup tapes / cold storage
- Healthcare, financial, government records with >10 yr retention
An adversary harvests signed material today and retroactively forges signatures once private key recovery becomes possible.
- X.509 root CA certificates (long validity)
- Code signing keys for software with long field life
- JWTs issued for non-repudiation or multi-year validity
- OCSP responses, CRLs, RFC 3161 timestamp tokens
- Document and contract digital signatures
HNDL Risk Calculator — Confidentiality Horizon
How urgent is your HNDL risk? Enter your data profile to see where you stand on the confidentiality horizon.
Two-Track Migration Model
Run key-exchange migration and signature/PKI migration as parallel tracks — they have different urgency drivers, different algorithms, and different operational constraints.
Urgency driven by data confidentiality lifetime. Begin with systems whose data is encrypted today and must remain confidential for >5 years.
- Algorithm: ML-KEM-768 (FIPS 203)
- Hybrid option: X25519+ML-KEM-768 (TLS 1.3 hybrid group)
- Targets: TLS, ECDH-wrapped keys, key-wrapping schemes
Urgency driven by key validity and artifact longevity. Root CAs, firmware signing, and code signing have the highest TNFL exposure.
- Deploy-now (CNSA 2.0 required): SP 800-208 hash-based signatures (LMS/XMSS) — NIST-standardised, validated, conservative; for firmware, software update signing, and secure boot. Requires HSM-backed state management — stateful schemes fail catastrophically on key-state reuse.
- General-purpose path: ML-DSA-65/87 (FIPS 204) — for high-volume signing as toolchains and FIPS-validated modules mature
Regulatory Timeline — ASD Milestones
| Deadline | ASD / ISM Requirement | HNDL / TNFL Implication |
|---|---|---|
| Now | Begin CBOM / cryptographic inventory. Identify systems with long-lived data or keys. | HNDL clock is already running — adversaries may be recording now |
| End of 2026 | Refined PQC transition plan. APRA-regulated entities: mapping of crypto dependencies required. | CBOM must be complete enough to scope Track A and Track B work |
| End of 2028 | PQC transition commenced for critical systems and data. | Track A (HNDL): TLS / key-wrap migration underway. Track B (TNFL): Root CA + firmware signing migrated. |
| End of 2030 | ISM: Cease use of traditional asymmetric cryptography. PQC transition complete. | All HNDL and TNFL exposure eliminated — classical signing and key exchange retired. |
FIPS 140-3 Deployment Environment Classification
Before planning migration, classify each system's deployment environment — this determines the earliest date PQC can enter production.
| Environment Class | Definition | PQC Deploy Status | Earliest PQC Production |
|---|---|---|---|
| Unrestricted | No FIPS validation required. Commercial SaaS, most cloud workloads, internal services. | Deploy now | Today. OpenSSL 3.5+, Go 1.24+, Node.js 24.5+, all major browsers support NIST PQC by default. |
| FIPS-aware | FIPS validation preferred but not legally mandated. Many commercial enterprise environments. | Proceed with risk acceptance | Now with documented risk acceptance — algorithms are NIST-standardised and CAVP-tested; full module validation in progress industry-wide. |
| FIPS-required | Federal government, defense contractors handling CUI, HIPAA technical safeguards, regulated finance. | Wait for CMVP validation | Mid-2027 earliest for software modules. CMVP process averages 18+ months. Use interim period for pilots, team training, policy updates. Note: FIPS 140-2 certificates move to Historical list 21 Sep 2026 — parallel migration pressure. |
| CNSA 2.0 / NSS | National Security Systems, NSA CNSA 2.0 scope. | Mandatory deadlines | PQC required in new acquisitions from 2027. Full compliance: 2030 (software/firmware), 2033 (network/OS), 2035 (all remaining). ML-KEM-1024 + ML-DSA-87 (Level 5) required. |
CBOM Format — CycloneDX
The industry standard for CBOM is CycloneDX — supported by OWASP, adopted by the Post-Quantum Computing Consortium (PQCC), and integrated into tooling from IBM, SandboxAQ, and the Linux Foundation's PQCA project (CBOMkit). Each CBOM entry captures: component identifier, algorithm in use, key sizes and parameters, protocol context, certificate/key location, and vulnerability status.
Discovery Output → Migration Decision
CBOM References
| Resource | Relevance |
|---|---|
| pqcframework.org | Comprehensive PQC migration framework: CBOM methodology, 8-phase programme, five-dimensional crypto agility model. Discovery is Phase 1; all other phases cascade from it. |
| ASD — Preparing for PQC | Australian Signals Directorate guidance. Explicitly advises that hybrid is case-by-case, not a universal first step. Emphasises crypto inventory as the critical starting point. |
| draft-ietf-pquip-pqc-engineers | IETF PQUIP engineering guide covering HNDL, TNFL, migration considerations, and algorithm selection criteria for different asset types. |
ML-KEM-768 — Key Encapsulation
ML-KEM (NIST FIPS 203) replaces ECDH for key exchange. It is a Key Encapsulation Mechanism: the sender encapsulates a shared secret using the recipient's public key; only the recipient can decapsulate it.
The private key dk never leaves the recipient. Only ek (public) and ct travel on the wire.
Size Comparison
| Property | ECDH P-256 | ML-KEM-768 | Overhead |
|---|---|---|---|
| Public key | 65 bytes | 1,184 bytes | ×18 |
| Ciphertext / KEM output | 65 bytes | 1,088 bytes | ×17 |
| Shared secret | 32 bytes | 32 bytes | ×1 |
| Quantum-safe | No | Yes | — |
crypto/mlkem since Go 1.24. This demo uses a real implementation — not a simulation.
ML-DSA-65 — Digital Signatures
ML-DSA (NIST FIPS 204) replaces ECDSA for digital signatures. It is a lattice-based scheme with significantly larger keys and signatures than classical algorithms — but is quantum-safe.
Private key never leaves the issuer. Verifier only needs the public key (1,952 B). Classical ECDSA private key is recoverable by a CRQC via Shor's algorithm.
Size Comparison
| Property | ECDSA P-256 | Ed25519 | ML-DSA-65 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Public key | 65 bytes | 32 bytes | 1,952 bytes |
| Signature | 72 bytes (DER) | 64 bytes | 3,309 bytes |
| Quantum-safe | No | No | Yes |
JWT Identity Token Transition
Today (classical)
{"typ":"agent+jwt","alg":"ES256"}
{"sub":"spiffe://bank.internal/agent-1",
"iss":"https://idp.bank.internal"}
Post-quantum era
{"typ":"agent+jwt","alg":"ML-DSA-65"}
{"sub":"spiffe://bank.internal/agent-1",
"iss":"https://idp.bank.internal"}
alg values for ML-DSA are being standardised in the IETF JOSE WG (draft-ietf-jose-fully-specified-algorithms). The algorithm ID shown is illustrative.
Hybrid Classical + Post-Quantum
Running both classical and PQC algorithms in parallel provides defense-in-depth: an attacker must break both simultaneously to compromise the session. This is the approach adopted in TLS 1.3 (X25519+ML-KEM-768) and in many SPIFFE/mTLS migration paths.
Each leg produces an independent shared secret. The session key is KDF(ss₁ ‖ ss₂) — an attacker must break both simultaneously.
Algorithm Negotiation & Rotation
Crypto agility (RFC 7696) means a system can negotiate the strongest mutually-supported algorithm and rotate when threat level changes — without protocol changes.
Algorithm Negotiation
Each peer advertises its supported algorithms. The negotiation picks the strongest common algorithm: post-quantum > hybrid > classical. Try a mix where only classical overlaps — watch the risk flag.
Threat Level → Algorithm Rotation
As the quantum threat evolves, the active algorithm set must change — without protocol changes. Each level shows which algorithms are required and why.
Crypto Agility as Operational Discipline
The technical mechanism above (algorithm negotiation + rotation) is necessary but not sufficient. The real goal is being able to replace your cryptography again and again — as standards break, vulnerabilities emerge, and threat levels evolve. That is an operational risk management challenge, not a protocol feature.
Per the Applied Quantum PQC Migration Framework, crypto agility is a five-dimensional operational discipline — each dimension has a concrete testability criterion:
Applications use cryptographic providers or adapters — no direct algorithm calls in app code. Algorithm selection is configuration-driven, not hardcoded. Dual-stack capability during transition so systems can negotiate both classical and PQC simultaneously.
Test: Can you change key exchange algorithm on a Tier-1 service via config change, without a code modification?
Rotation processes are tested, documented, and automated. Rollback capability exists. CBOM-driven alerting detects new deployments using deprecated algorithms before they accumulate.
Test: Can the org execute a full key-exchange rotation from detection to production in ≤48 hours?
Approved-algorithms list is maintained and enforced at CI/CD gates. The org can evaluate and approve a new algorithm candidate in weeks, not months. Clear risk-acceptance process for edge cases.
Test: Could the org evaluate and adopt an emergency algorithm replacement in <90 days from NIST announcement?
Engineers who can independently evaluate a new cipher's security properties, not just implement it. A quantum CTI (cyber threat intelligence) function monitors CRQC timeline updates, new break announcements, and emerging standards.
Test: Does the org have ≥2 engineers who can independently evaluate a new cipher's security claims?
Vendors and third parties support configuration-driven algorithm selection. HSM firmware updates without hardware replacement. Cloud KMS exposes algorithm selection as a customer-configurable parameter. Dependencies do not veto algorithm decisions.
Test: If adding HQC alongside ML-KEM, how many vendor dependencies would block that decision?
Private AI Inference — Homomorphic Encryption
When you query an AI model, the server sees your raw inputs — your prompts, your data, your query intent. Homomorphic encryption (HE) changes this: the server computes on encrypted inputs and returns an encrypted result. It never sees plaintext at any point.
In additive HE, Dec(Enc(a) + Enc(b)) = a + b without ever decrypting a or b individually.
This means a dot product (the core of every neural network layer) can run entirely on ciphertexts:
result_enc = Σ (Enc(input_i) × weight_i)
result = Decrypt(result_enc)
= Σ (input_i × weight_i)
HE scheme families:
- BFV / BGV — exact integers · batching · database queries
- CKKS — approximate floats · neural network inference · ML
- TFHE — boolean circuits · arbitrary programs · slower
- HEIR — Google's IR compiler targeting all three
Simulated HE Inference Demo
Enter input values and weights. The client encrypts inputs; the server computes the weighted sum on ciphertexts.
HE Scheme Comparison
| Scheme | Data Type | Operations | Use Case |
|---|---|---|---|
| BFV / BGV | Integers | +, × | Statistical queries, exact computation |
| CKKS | Floating point | +, ×, approx. | Neural network inference, ML |
| TFHE | Boolean circuits | AND, OR, NOT | Arbitrary programs (slow) |
| This demo | Integer (fixed-pt) | +, × scalar | Additive homomorphism illustration |
Identity & Auth Token Transition
WIMSE workload identity tokens (WIT), agent tokens, and mTLS certificates all use classical algorithms today. The transition to PQC affects every layer — and the threat begins now, not when a CRQC exists.
alg: ES256 (ECDSA P-256). Adversary intercepts: captures the signed JWT and the corresponding EC public key Q = k·G from JWKS.{"sub":"attacker","role":"admin","iss":"spiffe://mesh.internal/trusted-service"}. Any verifier that trusts the original JWKS accepts this as genuine.alg: ES256JWT
📋 signed tokens
waits for CRQC
recovers EC priv key
⚠ Forges tokens!
alg: ML-DSA-65JWT
📋 signed tokens
waits for CRQC
No known attack
✓ Cannot forge
Adversaries harvest signed JWTs and certificates today. When a CRQC arrives, Shor's algorithm recovers the EC private key — enabling retroactive forgery of any token signed with that key. Tokens signed with ML-DSA-65 cannot be forged — lattice problems have no known quantum speedup.
Both EC and ML-DSA keys active. SPIRE issues classical SVIDs only.
Both certs included. Workloads negotiate the strongest mutual algorithm on connect.
Configure TLS 1.3 hybrid group. All new sessions use both legs.
Wait for all outstanding SVIDs to expire. Rotate Root CA to ML-DSA-87.
All identity tokens, key exchanges, and certs use quantum-safe algorithms.
Header:
{
"typ": "agent+jwt",
"alg": "ES256", ← ECDSA P-256
"kid": "key-2026-01"
}
Payload:
{
"sub": "spiffe://mesh.internal/workload",
"cnf": { "jkt": "<EC P-256 thumbprint>" }
}
Header:
{
"typ": "agent+jwt",
"alg": "ML-DSA-65", ← FIPS 204
"kid": "pq-key-2027-01"
}
Payload:
{
"sub": "spiffe://mesh.internal/workload",
"cnf": { "jkt": "<ML-KEM-768 thumbprint>" }
}
mTLS Certificate Migration
| Layer | Today | Transition (hybrid) | PQC era |
|---|---|---|---|
| Root CA signing | ECDSA P-384 | ECDSA + ML-DSA-87 | ML-DSA-87 |
| Leaf cert signing | ECDSA P-256 | ECDSA + ML-DSA-65 | ML-DSA-65 |
| TLS key exchange | ECDH P-256 | X25519+ML-KEM-768 | ML-KEM-768 |
| SPIFFE SVID key | EC P-256 | EC + ML-KEM-768 | ML-KEM-768 |
Standards Tracker
Post-quantum cryptography standards relevant to this PoC, tracked across NIST and IETF.
| Standard | Body | Status | Purpose | Impl. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| NIST FIPS 203 | NIST | Published | ML-KEM — key encapsulation | pkg/pqc/mlkem.go |
| NIST FIPS 204 | NIST | Published | ML-DSA — digital signatures | pkg/pqc/mldsa.go |
| NIST FIPS 205 | NIST | Published | SLH-DSA — stateless hash-based signatures (general-purpose) | Registry only |
| NIST SP 800-208 | NIST | Published | LMS & XMSS — stateful hash-based signatures. Deploy-now Track B option for firmware/software signing. Required by CNSA 2.0. Needs HSM-backed state management. | Discovery tab |
| draft-ietf-pquip-pqc-engineers | IETF PQUIP | Active | PQC engineering guide | Threat taxonomy |
| draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design | IETF TLS | Active | Hybrid KEM in TLS 1.3 | hybridKEMDemo |
| draft-ietf-jose-fully-specified-algorithms | IETF JOSE | Active | PQC JOSE alg values | Identity tab |
| HEIR (Google) | Google OSS | Active | HE compiler IR | HE inference tab |
| pqcframework.org | Independent | v2.1 | 8-phase PQC migration programme; CBOM; TNFL threat class; five-dimensional crypto agility | Discovery tab, Agility tab |
| ASD — Preparing for PQC | ASD | Published | Cryptographic inventory as first step; hybrid PQC is case-by-case, not universal | Discovery tab, Hybrid tab |
| ASD — Stay Ahead of the Quantum Threat | ASD | Feb 2026 | ISM mandates cessation of traditional asymmetric crypto by end of 2030. Milestones: plan by 2026, commence critical systems by 2028, complete by 2030. ML-KEM + ML-DSA recommended. | Discovery tab milestones |
| HQC — Hamming Quasi-Cyclic | NIST (selected 2025) | Standardising | Second NIST KEM — code-based cryptography (different family from ML-KEM's lattices). Selected as ML-KEM backup for algorithm diversity / sovereignty. Not a replacement — complement for high-assurance environments that want two independent crypto families. | Supply Chain agility test reference |
| NIST FIPS 206 — FN-DSA | NIST | Published | FALCON — fast lattice-based signatures with small key+signature sizes. Suited for bandwidth-constrained environments (IoT, firmware headers). More complex to implement safely than ML-DSA. | Algorithm pipeline reference |
| CycloneDX CBOM (OWASP / PQCC) | OWASP / Linux Foundation | De facto standard | Recommended CBOM format. Native support for cryptographic asset types: algorithms, certificates, keys, protocols. Supported by IBM, SandboxAQ, PQCA CBOMkit. Integrates with CI/CD and SBOM tooling. | Discovery tab CBOM section |