Loading WASM module...

Cryptographic Agility

NIST FIPS 203/204/205 Post-Quantum Ready

Quantum Threat & Cryptographic Agility

A Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computer (CRQC) breaks RSA, ECDSA, and ECDH via Shor's algorithm. NIST published three quantum-safe standards in August 2024. Cryptographic agility is the ability to negotiate and rotate algorithms without changing protocols.

Harvest Now, Decrypt Later (HNDL) — Adversaries record encrypted traffic today to decrypt once a CRQC exists. Affects confidentiality: TLS session key exchange, long-lived encrypted records, stored data encrypted with RSA or ECDH-wrapped keys. Mitigated by ML-KEM replacing ECDH.
Trust Now, Forge Later (TNFL) — Adversaries harvest signed artifacts (JWTs, X.509 certificates, code signatures, timestamps) alongside their public keys. A future CRQC recovers the EC private signing key via Shor's algorithm — enabling retroactive forgery of tokens, certificates, and signed code that still verifies as genuine. Affects authenticity and non-repudiation. Mitigated by ML-DSA replacing ECDSA.
2030–
CRQC estimates begin
3
NIST FIPS published 2024
RFC 7696
Crypto Agility standard

NIST PQC Standards

StandardAlgorithmPurposeSecurity Level
FIPS 203ML-KEM (Kyber)Key encapsulation (replaces ECDH)L1/L3/L5
FIPS 204ML-DSA (Dilithium)Digital signatures (replaces ECDSA)L2/L3/L5
FIPS 205SLH-DSA (SPHINCS+)Hash-based signatures (stateless)L1/L3/L5
FIPS 206FN-DSA (FALCON)Fast lattice signatures — small key/sig sizes for constrained environmentsL1/L5
SP 800-208LMS / XMSSStateful hash-based signatures — deploy-now for firmware/software signing (CNSA 2.0 required)Various
HQC (selected 2025)Hamming Quasi-CyclicSecond KEM, code-based — algorithm diversity backup for ML-KEML1/L3/L5
Deployment status (F5 Labs, mid-2025): Client-side PQC support is now the default across all major browsers and runtimes (Chrome, Firefox, Safari, OpenSSL 3.5+, Go 1.24+, Node.js 24.5+). The constraint has shifted to server-side and infrastructure readiness — TLS termination at load balancers, proxies, and API gateways. Start there.

Migration Path — Case by Case

There is no universal two-phase migration. The right path for each system is determined by cryptographic discovery first — asset type, data lifetime, and interoperability requirements. ASD advises that hybrid is not universally recommended; the choice is per asset class.

Direct PQC Migration

Greenfield systems, internal mesh services, and short-lived credentials. No interoperability constraint — skip hybrid entirely, reduce complexity. Often the right default for new systems.

Hybrid Transition

Where backward compatibility is required, or where HNDL-sensitive long-lived data exists. Both algorithms must be broken simultaneously to compromise. Evaluate per asset class — not a universal first step.

Defer (low risk)

Systems with no HNDL or TNFL exposure: short-lived data with no confidentiality requirement beyond the CRQC era, or assets scheduled for decommission. Discovery + criticality determines this bucket.

Discovery comes first. Without a cryptographic inventory (CBOM) cross-referenced against asset criticality, you cannot determine which path applies to which system. See the Crypto Discovery tab for the methodology.

Cryptographic Discovery — Start Here

Before choosing algorithms or migration paths, you need to know what cryptography you have and where it lives. Discovery produces a CBOM (Cryptographic Bill of Materials) — an inventory of every algorithm in use, cross-referenced with asset criticality. The CBOM determines your actual risk surface and which migration path applies to each system.

The most common mistake in PQC migration programmes is jumping to algorithm selection before completing discovery. Without a CBOM, teams apply hybrid migration universally — wasting effort on low-risk assets while overlooking high-risk ones.

What a CBOM Covers

Asset CategoryExamplesAlgorithm in UseRelevant Threat
Key exchangeTLS handshakes, ECDH-wrapped symmetric keysECDH P-256 / P-384, X25519HNDL
Token signingJWTs, OAuth tokens, SAML assertionsECDSA (ES256/ES384), RSA (RS256)TNFL
Certificate signingTLS leaf certs, mTLS SVIDs, Root CAECDSA P-256 / P-384, RSA-2048TNFL
Code signaturesSigned binaries, container images, firmwareECDSA, RSA-PSSTNFL ⚠ high priority
Encrypted data at restDatabase encryption, key wrapping, backup encryptionAES-GCM (safe); RSA/ECDH key-wrap (unsafe)HNDL (key-wrap only)
Symmetric encryptionAES-128/256, ChaCha20-Poly1305AES, ChaCha20Low — Grover's doubles cost only
Hash functionsSHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512SHA-2, SHA-3Low — use SHA-384+ for margin

Asset Criticality Matrix

Cross-reference each CBOM entry against data lifetime and sensitivity to assign migration priority:

Short lifetime (<1 yr)Medium lifetime (1–10 yr)Long / indefinite (>10 yr)
Low sensitivity Defer Monitor Plan migration
High sensitivity / regulated Plan migration Priority — HNDL / TNFL risk Immediate — HNDL / TNFL risk
Root CAs / code signing keys Plan migration Priority — TNFL risk Immediate — TNFL risk

HNDL vs TNFL — Which Assets Are at Risk

HNDL-exposed assets

An adversary recording ciphertext today can decrypt it once a CRQC exists. Urgency scales with data confidentiality lifetime.

  • TLS session key exchange (ECDH leg)
  • RSA or ECDH-wrapped symmetric keys
  • Encrypted backup tapes / cold storage
  • Healthcare, financial, government records with >10 yr retention
TNFL-exposed assets

An adversary harvests signed material today and retroactively forges signatures once private key recovery becomes possible.

  • X.509 root CA certificates (long validity)
  • Code signing keys for software with long field life
  • JWTs issued for non-repudiation or multi-year validity
  • OCSP responses, CRLs, RFC 3161 timestamp tokens
  • Document and contract digital signatures

HNDL Risk Calculator — Confidentiality Horizon

How urgent is your HNDL risk? Enter your data profile to see where you stand on the confidentiality horizon.

Data must stay confidential for…
Data classification

Two-Track Migration Model

Run key-exchange migration and signature/PKI migration as parallel tracks — they have different urgency drivers, different algorithms, and different operational constraints.

Track A — Key Exchange (HNDL)

Urgency driven by data confidentiality lifetime. Begin with systems whose data is encrypted today and must remain confidential for >5 years.

  • Algorithm: ML-KEM-768 (FIPS 203)
  • Hybrid option: X25519+ML-KEM-768 (TLS 1.3 hybrid group)
  • Targets: TLS, ECDH-wrapped keys, key-wrapping schemes
Track B — Signatures & PKI (TNFL)

Urgency driven by key validity and artifact longevity. Root CAs, firmware signing, and code signing have the highest TNFL exposure.

  • Deploy-now (CNSA 2.0 required): SP 800-208 hash-based signatures (LMS/XMSS) — NIST-standardised, validated, conservative; for firmware, software update signing, and secure boot. Requires HSM-backed state management — stateful schemes fail catastrophically on key-state reuse.
  • General-purpose path: ML-DSA-65/87 (FIPS 204) — for high-volume signing as toolchains and FIPS-validated modules mature
SP 800-208 is the deploy-now Track B option. LMS and XMSS have validated implementations including current HSM firmware. The NSA CNSA 2.0 guidance requires them for software and firmware signing, the one signature migration NSA says to begin immediately. Do not wait for ML-DSA ecosystem maturity to start Track B.

Regulatory Timeline — ASD Milestones

DeadlineASD / ISM RequirementHNDL / TNFL Implication
Now Begin CBOM / cryptographic inventory. Identify systems with long-lived data or keys. HNDL clock is already running — adversaries may be recording now
End of 2026 Refined PQC transition plan. APRA-regulated entities: mapping of crypto dependencies required. CBOM must be complete enough to scope Track A and Track B work
End of 2028 PQC transition commenced for critical systems and data. Track A (HNDL): TLS / key-wrap migration underway. Track B (TNFL): Root CA + firmware signing migrated.
End of 2030 ISM: Cease use of traditional asymmetric cryptography. PQC transition complete. All HNDL and TNFL exposure eliminated — classical signing and key exchange retired.

FIPS 140-3 Deployment Environment Classification

Before planning migration, classify each system's deployment environment — this determines the earliest date PQC can enter production.

Environment ClassDefinitionPQC Deploy StatusEarliest PQC Production
Unrestricted No FIPS validation required. Commercial SaaS, most cloud workloads, internal services. Deploy now Today. OpenSSL 3.5+, Go 1.24+, Node.js 24.5+, all major browsers support NIST PQC by default.
FIPS-aware FIPS validation preferred but not legally mandated. Many commercial enterprise environments. Proceed with risk acceptance Now with documented risk acceptance — algorithms are NIST-standardised and CAVP-tested; full module validation in progress industry-wide.
FIPS-required Federal government, defense contractors handling CUI, HIPAA technical safeguards, regulated finance. Wait for CMVP validation Mid-2027 earliest for software modules. CMVP process averages 18+ months. Use interim period for pilots, team training, policy updates. Note: FIPS 140-2 certificates move to Historical list 21 Sep 2026 — parallel migration pressure.
CNSA 2.0 / NSS National Security Systems, NSA CNSA 2.0 scope. Mandatory deadlines PQC required in new acquisitions from 2027. Full compliance: 2030 (software/firmware), 2033 (network/OS), 2035 (all remaining). ML-KEM-1024 + ML-DSA-87 (Level 5) required.

CBOM Format — CycloneDX

The industry standard for CBOM is CycloneDX — supported by OWASP, adopted by the Post-Quantum Computing Consortium (PQCC), and integrated into tooling from IBM, SandboxAQ, and the Linux Foundation's PQCA project (CBOMkit). Each CBOM entry captures: component identifier, algorithm in use, key sizes and parameters, protocol context, certificate/key location, and vulnerability status.

Prioritise CBOM completion in layers: Layer 1 (Infrastructure) — TLS, SSH, VPN on load balancers, proxies, network appliances — target 100% within 3 months. Layer 2 (Platform) — cloud KMS, HSMs, internal CAs, identity providers — target 100% within 3 months. Layer 3 (Application) — code-level crypto, data-at-rest encryption, token signing — high-risk apps within 6 months. Layer 4 (OT/Embedded) — vendor-dependent systems with limited visibility — document gaps and accept with justification.

Discovery Output → Migration Decision

The output of discovery is a prioritised list of assets mapped to threats (HNDL / TNFL / neither) and criticality tiers. This — not a universal template — drives which systems get direct PQC migration, hybrid transition, or deferral. Return to the Overview tab for the decision framework.

CBOM References

ResourceRelevance
pqcframework.org Comprehensive PQC migration framework: CBOM methodology, 8-phase programme, five-dimensional crypto agility model. Discovery is Phase 1; all other phases cascade from it.
ASD — Preparing for PQC Australian Signals Directorate guidance. Explicitly advises that hybrid is case-by-case, not a universal first step. Emphasises crypto inventory as the critical starting point.
draft-ietf-pquip-pqc-engineers IETF PQUIP engineering guide covering HNDL, TNFL, migration considerations, and algorithm selection criteria for different asset types.

ML-KEM-768 — Key Encapsulation

ML-KEM (NIST FIPS 203) replaces ECDH for key exchange. It is a Key Encapsulation Mechanism: the sender encapsulates a shared secret using the recipient's public key; only the recipient can decapsulate it.

Key Encapsulation Flow
Recipient (workload / service) Network Sender (TLS peer / agent) GenerateKey() dk (private, 2400B) ek (public, 1184B) ek (encapsulation key, 1184 bytes) Encapsulate(ek) → (ct, ss₁) ct (ciphertext, 1088 bytes) Decapsulate(ct) → ss₂ ss₁ = ss₂ ✓ ss₁ established

The private key dk never leaves the recipient. Only ek (public) and ct travel on the wire.

Click to generate key pair and run encapsulation...

Size Comparison

PropertyECDH P-256ML-KEM-768Overhead
Public key65 bytes1,184 bytes×18
Ciphertext / KEM output65 bytes1,088 bytes×17
Shared secret32 bytes32 bytes×1
Quantum-safeNoYes
Go stdlib: ML-KEM-768 is in the Go standard library as crypto/mlkem since Go 1.24. This demo uses a real implementation — not a simulation.

ML-DSA-65 — Digital Signatures

ML-DSA (NIST FIPS 204) replaces ECDSA for digital signatures. It is a lattice-based scheme with significantly larger keys and signatures than classical algorithms — but is quantum-safe.

Sign → Verify Flow & Quantum Risk
JWT Issuer identity provider Verifier service / gateway GenerateKey() priv: 4,032 B — never leaves issuer pub: 1,952 B — published in JWKS Sign(priv, payload) → sig: 3,309 bytes JWT: header . payload . ML-DSA-65-sig Verify(pub, sig, payload) ✓ Valid ECDSA: Shor's recovers key on CRQC ⚠ ML-DSA-65: lattice — CRQC-resistant ✓

Private key never leaves the issuer. Verifier only needs the public key (1,952 B). Classical ECDSA private key is recoverable by a CRQC via Shor's algorithm.

Click to generate key pair and sign a token payload...

Size Comparison

PropertyECDSA P-256Ed25519ML-DSA-65
Public key65 bytes32 bytes1,952 bytes
Signature72 bytes (DER)64 bytes3,309 bytes
Quantum-safeNoNoYes

JWT Identity Token Transition

Today (classical)

{"typ":"agent+jwt","alg":"ES256"}
{"sub":"spiffe://bank.internal/agent-1",
 "iss":"https://idp.bank.internal"}

Post-quantum era

{"typ":"agent+jwt","alg":"ML-DSA-65"}
{"sub":"spiffe://bank.internal/agent-1",
 "iss":"https://idp.bank.internal"}
JOSE alg values for ML-DSA are being standardised in the IETF JOSE WG (draft-ietf-jose-fully-specified-algorithms). The algorithm ID shown is illustrative.

Hybrid Classical + Post-Quantum

Running both classical and PQC algorithms in parallel provides defense-in-depth: an attacker must break both simultaneously to compromise the session. This is the approach adopted in TLS 1.3 (X25519+ML-KEM-768) and in many SPIFFE/mTLS migration paths.

Hybrid is not a universal first step. ASD and leading PQC frameworks advise case-by-case assessment. Hybrid adds protocol complexity and significantly larger message sizes (ML-KEM-768 ek = 1,184 bytes vs ECDH P-256 = 65 bytes). It is the right choice where backward compatibility is required or where defense-in-depth on HNDL-sensitive data justifies the cost. New systems without interoperability constraints should consider direct PQC migration instead. Use the Crypto Discovery tab to determine which applies to each asset class.
Click to see X25519+ML-KEM-768 side by side...
Two-Leg Handshake — Both Legs Must Be Broken to Win
Client Server X25519 keygen pub₁: 32 B ML-KEM keygen ek: 1,184 B Leg 1 → Leg 2 → Leg 1: X25519 pub (32 B) Leg 2: ML-KEM ek (1,184 B) ECDH(pub₁) → ss₁ Encapsulate(ek) → (ct, ss₂) Leg 1 resp: ECDH result (32 B) Leg 2 resp: ML-KEM ct (1,088 B) Decapsulate(ct) → ss₂ ss₁ known ✓ ss₂ known ✓ KDF(ss₁ ‖ ss₂) = session secret ✓ — break BOTH to win CRQC breaks X25519 via Shor's · ML-KEM-768 survives (lattice) · Combined: still safe

Each leg produces an independent shared secret. The session key is KDF(ss₁ ‖ ss₂) — an attacker must break both simultaneously.

Algorithm Negotiation & Rotation

Crypto agility (RFC 7696) means a system can negotiate the strongest mutually-supported algorithm and rotate when threat level changes — without protocol changes.

Algorithm Negotiation

Each peer advertises its supported algorithms. The negotiation picks the strongest common algorithm: post-quantum > hybrid > classical. Try a mix where only classical overlaps — watch the risk flag.

Select peer capabilities and click Negotiate...

Threat Level → Algorithm Rotation

As the quantum threat evolves, the active algorithm set must change — without protocol changes. Each level shows which algorithms are required and why.

Select a threat level to see the rotation policy...

Crypto Agility as Operational Discipline

The technical mechanism above (algorithm negotiation + rotation) is necessary but not sufficient. The real goal is being able to replace your cryptography again and again — as standards break, vulnerabilities emerge, and threat levels evolve. That is an operational risk management challenge, not a protocol feature.

Per the Applied Quantum PQC Migration Framework, crypto agility is a five-dimensional operational discipline — each dimension has a concrete testability criterion:

1. Architectural Agility Dimension 1

Applications use cryptographic providers or adapters — no direct algorithm calls in app code. Algorithm selection is configuration-driven, not hardcoded. Dual-stack capability during transition so systems can negotiate both classical and PQC simultaneously.

Test: Can you change key exchange algorithm on a Tier-1 service via config change, without a code modification?

2. Operational Agility Dimension 2

Rotation processes are tested, documented, and automated. Rollback capability exists. CBOM-driven alerting detects new deployments using deprecated algorithms before they accumulate.

Test: Can the org execute a full key-exchange rotation from detection to production in ≤48 hours?

3. Governance Agility Dimension 3

Approved-algorithms list is maintained and enforced at CI/CD gates. The org can evaluate and approve a new algorithm candidate in weeks, not months. Clear risk-acceptance process for edge cases.

Test: Could the org evaluate and adopt an emergency algorithm replacement in <90 days from NIST announcement?

4. Skills Agility Dimension 4

Engineers who can independently evaluate a new cipher's security properties, not just implement it. A quantum CTI (cyber threat intelligence) function monitors CRQC timeline updates, new break announcements, and emerging standards.

Test: Does the org have ≥2 engineers who can independently evaluate a new cipher's security claims?

5. Supply Chain Agility Dimension 5

Vendors and third parties support configuration-driven algorithm selection. HSM firmware updates without hardware replacement. Cloud KMS exposes algorithm selection as a customer-configurable parameter. Dependencies do not veto algorithm decisions.

Test: If adding HQC alongside ML-KEM, how many vendor dependencies would block that decision?

The threat-level rotation above demonstrates the trigger mechanism. The five dimensions above are what determine whether an organisation can act on that trigger reliably — across every system in the CBOM, within the required SLA.

Private AI Inference — Homomorphic Encryption

When you query an AI model, the server sees your raw inputs — your prompts, your data, your query intent. Homomorphic encryption (HE) changes this: the server computes on encrypted inputs and returns an encrypted result. It never sees plaintext at any point.

Why Private Inference Matters
❌ Without HE (today's default)
Client holds: inputs = [5, 3, 8]
↓ sends plaintext
Network: data exposed in transit
Server: sees [5, 3, 8] ⚠ logs your query · fingerprints your data · stores inputs
↓ plaintext result
Server also sees your result: 5.2
Exposure surface: query intent, proprietary data, user behaviour, results — all visible to the model provider, logged, and potentially breachable.
✓ With Homomorphic Encryption
Client holds: inputs = [5, 3, 8]
↓ HE.Encrypt()
Ciphertexts: [X₁, X₂, X₃] — opaque blobs
↓ sends only ciphertexts
Server: sees ??? (ciphertexts only) applies model weights · computes dot product on ciphertexts
↓ encrypted result
Encrypted output: [R] — server never decrypts
↓ HE.Decrypt() — client only
Result: 5.2 (plaintext, client-only)
Server's view: three opaque blobs in, one opaque blob out. Zero knowledge of your data, query intent, or result.
The Homomorphic Property — Why Math Works on Ciphertexts

In additive HE, Dec(Enc(a) + Enc(b)) = a + b without ever decrypting a or b individually.

This means a dot product (the core of every neural network layer) can run entirely on ciphertexts:

result_enc = Σ (Enc(input_i) × weight_i)
result     = Decrypt(result_enc)
           = Σ (input_i × weight_i)

HE scheme families:

  • BFV / BGV — exact integers · batching · database queries
  • CKKS — approximate floats · neural network inference · ML
  • TFHE — boolean circuits · arbitrary programs · slower
  • HEIR — Google's IR compiler targeting all three
HEIR (Homomorphic Encryption Intermediate Representation) — Google's open-source compiler IR for HE programs, lowering HE operations to hardware-optimised instruction sequences. Not an IETF standard, but the leading open approach to making HE inference practical at inference-server scale.

Simulated HE Inference Demo

Enter input values and weights. The client encrypts inputs; the server computes the weighted sum on ciphertexts.

Enter inputs and weights, then click Run...

HE Scheme Comparison

SchemeData TypeOperationsUse Case
BFV / BGVIntegers+, ×Statistical queries, exact computation
CKKSFloating point+, ×, approx.Neural network inference, ML
TFHEBoolean circuitsAND, OR, NOTArbitrary programs (slow)
This demoInteger (fixed-pt)+, × scalarAdditive homomorphism illustration

Identity & Auth Token Transition

WIMSE workload identity tokens (WIT), agent tokens, and mTLS certificates all use classical algorithms today. The transition to PQC affects every layer — and the threat begins now, not when a CRQC exists.

Trust Now, Forge Later (TNFL) — Adversaries harvest signed JWTs, X.509 certificates, and their corresponding public keys today. Once a CRQC arrives, Shor's algorithm recovers the EC private key — enabling retroactive forgery of any token or certificate previously signed by that key. This is a distinct threat from HNDL (which targets encrypted data): TNFL targets authenticity and non-repudiation. JWTs do not need to be decrypted to be exploited — the attacker forges new ones. Migrating signing to ML-DSA eliminates this risk.
Simulate TNFL Signature Forgery Attack
Classical computer Brute-force EC P-256 key recovery · ~2¹²⁸ ops 0 % → estimated completion: heat death of universe Quantum CRQC — Shor's Algorithm QFT + period finding · O(n³) · seconds 0 %
Step 1 — Today: Agent signs JWT with alg: ES256 (ECDSA P-256). Adversary intercepts: captures the signed JWT and the corresponding EC public key Q = k·G from JWKS.
Step 2 — Stored: Adversary archives the signed JWT + public key. Classical computers cannot recover private key k. The adversary waits.
Step 3 — CRQC era: A cryptographically-relevant quantum computer becomes available. Shor's algorithm applies Quantum Fourier Transform to solve the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem, recovering private key k in seconds.
Step 4 — Forgery: Adversary uses recovered key k to sign a new JWT: {"sub":"attacker","role":"admin","iss":"spiffe://mesh.internal/trusted-service"}. Any verifier that trusts the original JWKS accepts this as genuine.
With ML-DSA-65: Shor's algorithm has no attack on lattice-based cryptography (no known quantum speedup). The adversary's archive of signed JWTs is useless — the private key cannot be recovered. Forgery is impossible.
Trust Now, Forge Later (TNFL) — Why Signature Transition Starts Today
2025 — Today2027–28 — Stored2030+ — CRQC Era
Classical (ECDSA P-256 / ES256)
Agent issues
alg: ES256
JWT
Attacker records
📋 signed tokens
waits for CRQC
Shor's algorithm
recovers EC priv key
⚠ Forges tokens!
Post-Quantum (ML-DSA-65 / FIPS 204)
Agent issues
alg: ML-DSA-65
JWT
Attacker records
📋 signed tokens
waits for CRQC
Shor's tries lattice
No known attack
✓ Cannot forge

Adversaries harvest signed JWTs and certificates today. When a CRQC arrives, Shor's algorithm recovers the EC private key — enabling retroactive forgery of any token signed with that key. Tokens signed with ML-DSA-65 cannot be forged — lattice problems have no known quantum speedup.

SPIFFE / SVID Migration Roadmap
1
Add ML-DSA-65 signing key to SPIRE server
Both EC and ML-DSA keys active. SPIRE issues classical SVIDs only.
2
Issue hybrid SVIDs (ECDSA + ML-DSA-65)
Both certs included. Workloads negotiate the strongest mutual algorithm on connect.
3
Rotate TLS key exchange to X25519+ML-KEM-768
Configure TLS 1.3 hybrid group. All new sessions use both legs.
4
Decommission classical signing key (after SVID TTL expires)
Wait for all outstanding SVIDs to expire. Rotate Root CA to ML-DSA-87.
Full PQC posture — CRQC-ready
All identity tokens, key exchanges, and certs use quantum-safe algorithms.
JWT / Agent Token (today)
Header:
{
  "typ": "agent+jwt",
  "alg": "ES256",     ← ECDSA P-256
  "kid": "key-2026-01"
}
Payload:
{
  "sub": "spiffe://mesh.internal/workload",
  "cnf": { "jkt": "<EC P-256 thumbprint>" }
}
JWT / Agent Token (PQC era)
Header:
{
  "typ": "agent+jwt",
  "alg": "ML-DSA-65",  ← FIPS 204
  "kid": "pq-key-2027-01"
}
Payload:
{
  "sub": "spiffe://mesh.internal/workload",
  "cnf": { "jkt": "<ML-KEM-768 thumbprint>" }
}

mTLS Certificate Migration

LayerTodayTransition (hybrid)PQC era
Root CA signingECDSA P-384ECDSA + ML-DSA-87ML-DSA-87
Leaf cert signingECDSA P-256ECDSA + ML-DSA-65ML-DSA-65
TLS key exchangeECDH P-256X25519+ML-KEM-768ML-KEM-768
SPIFFE SVID keyEC P-256EC + ML-KEM-768ML-KEM-768
Crypto agility in SPIRE: SPIRE Server signing key must be rotated to ML-DSA before SVID TTL expires. Plan key rotation windows carefully — SVID renewals fail if the signing algorithm is not supported by the SPIRE agent version.

Standards Tracker

Post-quantum cryptography standards relevant to this PoC, tracked across NIST and IETF.

StandardBodyStatusPurposeImpl.
NIST FIPS 203 NIST Published ML-KEM — key encapsulation pkg/pqc/mlkem.go
NIST FIPS 204 NIST Published ML-DSA — digital signatures pkg/pqc/mldsa.go
NIST FIPS 205 NIST Published SLH-DSA — stateless hash-based signatures (general-purpose) Registry only
NIST SP 800-208 NIST Published LMS & XMSS — stateful hash-based signatures. Deploy-now Track B option for firmware/software signing. Required by CNSA 2.0. Needs HSM-backed state management. Discovery tab
draft-ietf-pquip-pqc-engineers IETF PQUIP Active PQC engineering guide Threat taxonomy
draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design IETF TLS Active Hybrid KEM in TLS 1.3 hybridKEMDemo
draft-ietf-jose-fully-specified-algorithms IETF JOSE Active PQC JOSE alg values Identity tab
HEIR (Google) Google OSS Active HE compiler IR HE inference tab
pqcframework.org Independent v2.1 8-phase PQC migration programme; CBOM; TNFL threat class; five-dimensional crypto agility Discovery tab, Agility tab
ASD — Preparing for PQC ASD Published Cryptographic inventory as first step; hybrid PQC is case-by-case, not universal Discovery tab, Hybrid tab
ASD — Stay Ahead of the Quantum Threat ASD Feb 2026 ISM mandates cessation of traditional asymmetric crypto by end of 2030. Milestones: plan by 2026, commence critical systems by 2028, complete by 2030. ML-KEM + ML-DSA recommended. Discovery tab milestones
HQC — Hamming Quasi-Cyclic NIST (selected 2025) Standardising Second NIST KEM — code-based cryptography (different family from ML-KEM's lattices). Selected as ML-KEM backup for algorithm diversity / sovereignty. Not a replacement — complement for high-assurance environments that want two independent crypto families. Supply Chain agility test reference
NIST FIPS 206 — FN-DSA NIST Published FALCON — fast lattice-based signatures with small key+signature sizes. Suited for bandwidth-constrained environments (IoT, firmware headers). More complex to implement safely than ML-DSA. Algorithm pipeline reference
CycloneDX CBOM (OWASP / PQCC) OWASP / Linux Foundation De facto standard Recommended CBOM format. Native support for cryptographic asset types: algorithms, certificates, keys, protocols. Supported by IBM, SandboxAQ, PQCA CBOMkit. Integrates with CI/CD and SBOM tooling. Discovery tab CBOM section